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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City 
University London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
 
t is a world where almost all companies 
are either seeking to find, or are fearful of, 
the next disruptive ‘unicorn’. Global 
demographic and environmental change, in 
conjunction with “digital transformation across 
all sectors, increasing shareholder and 
regulatory scrutiny, and the heightened 
presence of global competitors” (EY, 2015) are 
amongst the ‘megatrends’ significantly 
impacting the strategies of large corporates. 
Against this backdrop the number of Corporate 
Venture Capital (“CVC”) units worldwide 
doubled between 2012 and 2014, as corporates 
increasingly view CVC as part of the solution to 
assist them to “identify life-threatening changes 
to their business early, so that they can adapt 
or, better yet, get in on the act” (Economist, 
2014). 
There is general academic agreement that CVC 
has a positive effect on firm performance, 
although the studies caution that these benefits 
are not guaranteed and ventures may take 
several years to become profitable, as with any 
VC investment. Furthermore, recent studies 
provide empirical evidence to substantiate the 
claim that CVC-backed ventures fare better 
than independent venture capitalist-backed 
ones, as well as indicating that CVC-backed 
entrepreneurial ventures receive higher 
valuations at IPO compared to ventures funded 
solely by traditional VCs. 
Given the growing importance of this area and 
the new maturity of the field (no longer just a 
pro-cyclical corporate ‘nice to have’) Cass 
Business School has carried out an interview-
based study to ascertain key questions and 
corporate needs to be able to answer if it is to 
take a first step into this high risk/high reward, 
but possibly essential, field. 
Study description 
Data was collected through semi-structured 
interviews with nine practitioners from CVC  
 
units of large, global corporates. See the 
Appendix for details of the CVC units involved. 
 The study sought to: examine how CVC 
units prioritise strategic versus financial 
objectives  understand how CVC units define their 
investment boundaries (the importance of 
‘internal fit’)  investigate how CVC investors appraise 
potential investments to ensure they are 
capable of meeting, in particular strategic 
objectives  examine how CVC governance structures 
differ and how they seek to align the 
interests of the corporate and the CVC 
team  understand how CVC practitioners 
measure strategic returns and define 
‘success’ as further verification of objective 
prioritisation 
Our conclusions are in the form of the three 
questions that a corporate must be able to 
answer before proceeding: (For more detail see 
the conclusion of this report) 
 What is the intended primary objective of 
the CVC programme? 
  What is the best way to configure the 
CVC unit? 
- Not just in terms of employees, but also 
authority and incentivisation 
  How should investments be appraised? 
- Not an easy one, given the multiple 
potential responses to the first question 
And, as usual, get the CEO on board. 
“Most CVC programmes tend to be CEO-
driven, and if they’re not CEO-driven and don’t 
continue to have the support from the CEO, it 
becomes really problematic for the longevity of 
the group.”
I 
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What is CVC (and what is it not)?
e would definite it as “a minority 
(equity) investment by an 
established corporation in a 
privately held entrepreneurial venture” with 
high-growth potential. This would include both 
direct investments and investment into funds 
dedicated to that corporate. 
What it isn’t 
For the purpose of this report we do not include 
internal venture capital within the corporate 
structure. 
While a conventional VC’s sole objective is to 
generate a financial return (a capital gain), from 
the sale of investee businesses, the reasons 
why corporates may choose to undertake CVC 
activities are more nuanced and the CVC fund’s 
performance is more likely (but not always), to 
be assessed on the basis of both financial and 
strategic returns, making the analysis of the 
unit’s strategy and success problematic, 
something this report seeks to address. 
A further difference between VC and CVC is 
that CVC funds have been observed to invest 
across a wider spectrum of the ‘business 
lifecycle’ as compared to traditional VC funds 
(which have a narrower focus), and syndication 
opportunities often arise for CVC units to invest 
alongside PE investors, not just VC investors. 
It is also not necessarily about making 
investments in companies that eventually are 
bought 100% by the parent. In 2014 Google 
acquired Nest Labs for $3.2bn. One of the 
beneficiaries of its rise in value (from an $825m 
valuation a year before) was Google Ventures, 
Google’s CVC arm. However despite the 
headlines this created, this is not the norm and 
in this instance it was only the second portfolio 
company to be sold to Google. Google 
Ventures has sold as many portfolio companies 
to Yahoo and Cisco systems as to Google. 
PitchBook data shows that the average rate of 
successful exits to a CVC’s parent is just 3%. 
And Intel Capital, considered by many to be the 
gold standard for CVC, only sold 7 out of 259 
successful exits to Intel. 
Characteristics of CVC 
So if exiting to the corporate does not define 
CVC’s and is not a good characterisation vis a 
vis ‘normal’ venture capital, what are some of 
its characteristics?
 
Figure 1: Practical models for the pursuit of CVC (Adapted from Clark (2013)) 
 
 
 
W 
 
Corporate / Direct 
Investment Internal Dedicated Fund External Fund 
Structure 
 Direct investment 
funding each deal ‘off-
balance sheet’  Investments closely 
related to BUs and 
future business 
opportunities. 
 GP Model: Corporate 
acts as LP in 100% 
captive fund.  Fund retains greater 
autonomy than ‘Direct’ 
model, but still 
answerable to single 
LP. 
 LP Model: GP is 
external firm, whilst 
corporate is LP ‘part 
investor’.  Decision on 
investments is in hands 
of GP (based on fund 
parameters). 
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Henry Chesbrough (UC Berkeley) wrote, ‘in 
addition to acting somewhat as an incubator 
and producing explicit financial returns for the 
parent company, corporate VCs are also in the 
business of making “enabling investments”’. 
These combine financial gain with operational 
gain. 
This ‘enabling’ strategy can mean the 
investments have more time and capital 
committed pre IPO. The median holding period 
for a company that has received CVC funding 
is around 6.25 years, in contrast to a ‘normal’ 
VC backed business where the figure is around 
4.5 years.  
Figure 2:  Median Holding Time (Years) for VC backed 
Companies (Source: PitchBook) 
 
This, logically means larger exits, a median exit 
size of $70m+ in the four years post the 
financial crisis. This compares to an overall 
average in that period of around $55m. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Median VC-backed Exit Size ($M) (Source: 
PitchBook) 
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Why is this a big moment for CVC? 
he first ‘waves’ of CVC investment were 
characterised by peaks occurring at the 
end of economic cycles. This is 
characteristic of VC overall and for CVCs we 
would expect this pattern to be exaggerated, 
given the reliance on the parent’s balance 
sheet. By the mid-1970s a quarter of Fortune 
500 firms were reported to have active CVC 
programmes (and famously 3M and DuPont). 
This ‘first wave’ was dented by the oil shocks 
and subsequent recession, the second mid 80s 
peak by another recession, the third by the tech 
bubble, and the fourth by the global financial 
crisis….or was it? 
While the figure below makes it clear that the 
amounts of CVC equity invested fell back in 
2009 following the 2008 global financial crisis, 
despite the five years of economic uncertainty 
which ensued CVC has been thriving. The 
Economist (2014) suggests that the number of 
corporate-venture functions worldwide doubled 
to 1,100 between 2012 and 2014. Figure 4 
below shows the overall global trends in terms 
of volume and number of CVC deals.  
Global Corporate Venturing reports that nearly 
half the top 100 companies in the Fortune 500 
are actively pursuing CVC, albeit only 23.2% of 
the full 500 in Fortune’s list are doing so. 
Likewise Ernst & Young observed in 2015 that 
19% of respondents to their ‘Global Corporate 
Development Survey’ currently have a venture 
fund, while nearly half expected the number of 
venture funds in their industry to increase.  
CVC has also become more geographically 
diverse. The Asian market is at the forefront of 
the latest trend, given “China and India were 
second and third respectively in terms of the 
value of corporate venturing deals sealed, with 
US$10billion and US$3billion invested by 
syndicates involving corporate venturing units 
[…], driven by large investments – especially 
those by China-based internet companies 
Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu, which have also 
been highly active in the US.”1 
It appears that CVC has broken clear of 
cyclicality and become a more permanent part 
of an ever more impermanent world. Whether 
this is due to the significance of disruptive 
technology or not, it has implications in terms of 
its purpose, whether strategic or financial. 
 
 
Figure 4: CVC Deal Value & Volume 1980-2015 (Jan to Jun Only) (Source: ThomsonONE) 
 
 
                                                            
1 Lewis, T. Global Corporate Venturing, Feb 2015 
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What should be the purpose of CVC? 
he ‘purpose’ of CVC is not obvious to 
define, whether you look for direct 
financial returns or more intangible 
strategic benefits. In fact we would break the 
potential benefits into three areas (and we 
highlight the findings of our study in each): 
1. Financial returns 
While it was not the intention of this study to 
examine financial returns, it was deemed 
important nonetheless to provide an overview 
of the way companies approach financial 
returns, given that they are an important aspect 
of CVC activity.  
A majority of interviewees suggested that their 
primary financial objective was to be a ‘self-
sufficient’ division; thus covering costs and 
replenishing capital for future deployment in 
investments. 
All interviewees suggested that they were 
required to report regularly on the financial 
health of their portfolio – the majority employ 
‘standard’ VC-metrics; internal rate of return 
(IRR) and cash-on-cash multiples, as a basis 
for reporting and quantifying returns upon exit. 
While a number of interviewees suggested that 
they ensure returns are commensurate with 
their co-investors on projects, only one ‘off-
balance sheet’ investor indicated its CVC unit 
benchmarks and publicises its financial returns 
against traditional VC:  
"Externally, we publicise that we achieve top 
quartile returns. We're investing with ‘Tier 1 
VCs’, so our returns are top quartile.”  
2. Strategic returns 
The difficulty of tracking and measuring 
strategic returns is almost self-evident. 
Interviewees were therefore asked to explain 
their approach to quantifying and tracking 
‘strategic value’ added to the corporate by the 
CVC unit. A majority of interviewees confirmed 
that strategic returns remain a challenge to 
track, however some have succeeded in 
defining methods for quantification of their 
value. When looking at investments close to 
‘core business’, interviewees from several 
CVCs stated that these were easier to quantify 
numerically, because you can estimate 
elements such as the market potential of a new 
compound or methodology, a new product 
launched in a different geography or a cost 
saving. However, only one employs a ‘strategic 
hurdle’ requirement: 
“We say that we will deliver back to our core 
businesses a 5-10x strategic value to the 
business versus our equity stake. So what 
does that mean? The discounts we get on the 
service or products that we invested in and all 
the savings they get through more rapid 
deployment of the technology must be 5-10x 
more. And we have done that a number of 
times now.” 
Beyond specific investments, a number of 
interviewees suggested that CVC has a more 
important role in the corporate’s wider venturing 
and renewal processes. A small number of 
interviewees stated that they track and report 
on collaborations and inter-firm relationships 
which have come about as a result of CVC 
activity, but have not resulted in investment. 
The interviewee from one summarised their 
approach to articulating strategic benefits in this 
regard, as follows: 
“The strategic piece we do through two or three 
means. One, we describe the collaboration that 
exists between portfolio companies and BUs. 
[…] Secondly, we document and track all, what 
we call, “non-portfolio activities”; the things we 
do that don't lead to investment but lead to 
some potential value for [us]. Particularly, 
these are introductions to companies that our 
company either didn't know about, or hasn't 
looked into.[ . ] Finally, we track the softer 
things like introductions; going to, or speaking 
at conferences; getting involved in EU activities 
related to innovation, government subsidies, 
R&D; and helping incubators or accelerators. 
We use these three elements as evidence of 
‘soft-value’ that we've created.” 
T 
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3. Resource transfer  
The table below presents a qualitative assessment of the degree of ‘resource transfer’ to and from a 
Corporate Parent (CP) as a result of CVC activities. The majority benefit from a “high” level of resource 
transfer from investee companies. 
Figure 5: Assessment of resource transfer through CVC investment
 
Resource 
Transfer Explanation / Justification (Reinforced by interview extracts provided in Error! Reference 
source not found. above) To Parent 
From 
Parent 
 
   
CVC 1   3 in 4 investments targeted at making improvements to existing operations, with strategic benefits quantified during early stages of 
investment appraisal process. 
CVC 2 
  
Investment scope is broad, with a primary emphasis on financial 
returns. However, the interviewee’s view on their most 
“successful” investment was one which was subsequently 
acquired and went on to be a product which has achieved over a 
billion units of sale. 
CVC 3   Investment thesis targets complementary sectors; the CVC unit has generated significant (£bn returns) from a recent exit and 
acquired a small number of its portfolio companies. 
CVC 4 
  
Investments closely aligned with existing BUs with a focus on 
improving innovation. Investments have led to M&A opportunities 
which have significantly enhanced the parent company’s existing 
offering. Nearly all the investee companies have resulted in inter-
firm collaborations. 
CVC 5   Investments aligned with existing BUs – strategic rationale and benefit to investees is defined during the early investment process. Portfolio investments have been acquired and significantly 
enhanced BU offering. 
CVC 6 
  
Wide investment scope – external LP-GP structure provides 
incentive to focus on financial returns above strategic relevance 
for CP. They had missed out on acquiring a portfolio company 
which would have made added value and cited a number of 
examples of situations where the CVC team had not invested but 
had achieved other types of strategic link. 
CVC 7   Investments must have strategic relevance. Example: acquired one investment to form the foundation of a customer offering with over 1-million customers and committed a further £0.5bn in further 
funding. 
CVC 8 
  
This CVC is early in its establishment, having only made two 
investments. Its focus is very much on strategic enhancement of 
its customer offering. They have established an internal team to 
maximise collaboration with investee companies, as well as those 
it acquires and licenses.  
CVC 9 
  
Investments have a strategic focus, with a remit to provide a view 
on industry disruption – “success” defined in terms of most 
significant financial return to CP. They missed out on an 
opportunity to acquire the portfolio company, which has gone on to 
become a substantial player in the media space and now 
competes with them in a number of respects.  
 
Key:  = High,  = Medium,  = Low 
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So how do you measure success? 
And given this complexity of outcomes, how do 
you define success? 
Interviewees were asked to describe what 
“success” means to them in the context of their 
CVC unit.  A number of responses focused on 
‘organisational success’; bound closely to 
achieving strategic and financial investment 
objectives; with a particular focus on innovation 
as well as team longevity. 
“The ultimate success is to have ventures sit at 
the heart of our innovation ecosystem within 
[the parent], to be recognised as a centre of 
excellence within…for venturing and 
partnering with the external business 
environment, and to have a self-financing and 
sustainable team and portfolio. 
So, where are we on that journey? We’ve had 
some significant successes recently - on the 
financial side, we exited an investment which 
has covered our annual budget plus more this 
year. On the strategic side, we’ve had huge 
success. We’ve deployed five technologies into 
the organisation, the strategic value of which 
has been 3x our budget. So, we’re hitting that 
metric too.” 
In the main, those who gave examples of 
individual investments did so to highlight that it 
had resulted in the parent company developing 
early experience of a new technology and/or 
science, which resulted in the parent acquiring 
the investment and creating significant new 
revenues for them, as the following example 
demonstrates. Note that these comments could 
easily be critiqued as being ‘soft’ on metrics and 
‘heavy’ on anecdote but again emphasises why 
the focus of this report is on putting in place a 
sound structure upfront given the difficulty of 
‘post-game’ analysis. 
“We invested, back in 2007/8, in a very 
speculative, early stage company that was 
developing a new technology. [We] would 
never have spent the money on that research 
work, because it was research in a technically 
                                                            
2 Ginsberg & Hay, European Management Journal, 1994. 
Dougherty, Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 1995. 
Thornhill & Amit, Journal of Business Venturing, 2001. 
very difficult area and people had been working 
without success for many years. The company 
was taking a slightly different approach, so we 
invested strategically and speculatively. 
Shortly after, it made the technical 
breakthrough which opened up a market worth 
potentially hundreds of millions of dollars.”  
Which goal (financial or strategic)? 
The importance of each has varied over time. A 
1988 study showed that financial returns were 
the primary objective of the majority of early 
CVC initiatives, albeit a (sizeable) minority also 
emphasised the pursuit of strategic objectives. 
However, more recent studies substantiate the 
strategic role of CVC activity and notably one 
claims that “the fraction of solely financially 
orientated CVC programmes [are] on the 
decline”. 
Initial academic research into the linkages with 
business strategy focused primarily on the 
optimal extent as to which a venture must be 
tied to the activities of the corporate parent; 
referred to as “desired tightness of coupling or 
fit between corporate parent and venture.” 
Mid-1990s research concluded that 
independent ventures are more successful 
precisely because they are free of corporate 
bureaucracy and therefore more flexible. Then 
again, a later study found, based on an 
assessment on ‘economic’ and ‘relational’ 
dimensions, that a close ‘internal fit’ between a 
venture and parent is positively associated with 
venture performance. While this is useful, it 
provides little guidance for corporates on the 
practical steps to consider for their CVC 
programmes towards the strategic outcomes 
they might hope to achieve, or how to 
strategically drive CVC activities.2  
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As shown in Figure 6, those CVC units which 
place a higher strategic importance on their 
CVC activities tend to invest in opportunities 
with a higher degree of ‘internal fit’. The 
exception is where businesses have a degree 
of consumer interface – CVC units associated 
with these types of businesses seemingly tend 
to place less importance on ‘internal fit’ with 
existing business, given they are focused 
somewhat more on responding to consumer 
trends which evolve more rapidly, and are 
particularly susceptible to variation driven by 
digital development and disruption. 
Clearly there is conflicting evidence as to both 
what ‘purpose’ gives the most successful 
results and what factors are key to success. 
The important thing is to define the purpose of 
‘your’ CVC and hence be able to answer the 
connected question as to the degree to which 
you should ‘free’ the CVC unit or integrate it 
within the organisation. Prioritising strategic 
and financial returns creates a natural tension 
in addition to that created between internal and 
‘external’ R&D. 
“I know a couple of CVC investors who talk 
about fostering a creative tension between 
R&D internally and external investments by 
investing away from aligned product. In our 
case, that doesn't work -- at least, we haven't 
figured out how to do that because, as I 
mentioned before, what we always try to 
ensure we know is “what else will [we] bring to 
the table for the investment other than 
money?”” 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Summary of CVC Unit objectives, Internal Fit, Governance and Resource Transfer 
 
Importance of objective Degree of Required 
‘Internal fit’ with 
Existing Operations 
Resource Transfer      
 
Strategic Financial To Parent From Parent 
CVC 1   High   
CVC 2   Complementary / Low   
CVC 3   Complementary   
CVC 4   High   
CVC 5   High   
CVC 6   Complementary   
CVC 7   High   
CVC 8   Complementary   
CVC 9   Complementary   
 
    
 
Key:  = High,  = Medium,  = Low 
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What benefits can be observed? 
ased on analysis of interviews 
conducted, this study has observed 
that CVC is capable of delivering the 
following five key benefits to their CP: 
1. A window on emerging technology 
…”So we were really founded to provide 
a...what you would call a lens on the emerging 
technology disruption, feeding that viewpoint 
into the senior management's thinking and 
really providing them with a way to understand 
what was happening in the space.” 
2. Market tracking 
“However, if I can find technology or products 
which have hundreds of millions of potential 
value which [we] may never have seen or had 
access to, that has much more impact, much 
more than the capital itself!” 
3. Add value to in-house R&D 
“[we] moved towards investing in a core 
portfolio of technologies that help our current 
businesses and have invested on a roughly 
“three out of four basis”; so on average three 
deals focused on delivering technologies 
complementary to our core.” 
4. Enhance customer offering 
“My remit is to look for opportunities with a 
strategic alignment to the existing business; 
primarily retail and brands, however, in order to 
find products to put underneath those brands.” 
5. Capture supply and/or stimulate demand 
“Firstly, smart investments which generate 
financial returns; secondly strategic benefit 
derived from building out the supply chain and 
driving technology adoption.” 
You will note the lack of a ‘financial objective’, 
indeed, the ‘financial benefits’ (returns) of a 
CVC programme might often fail to make a 
significant impact at the corporate level, 
described by one interviewee as “a rounding 
error”. 
Again, those CVC investors who sought to 
invest furthest from the parent company’s core 
activities were more commonly observed to 
have ‘consumer-facing’ elements  to their 
business, requiring an eye on disruptive 
consumer trends, which were often tangentially 
(rather than directly) related to the core 
business. 
In the main, those investing closest to their core 
operations cited investments which their parent 
had subsequently acquired as examples of 
situations where CVC was most successful. By 
investing early, they were able to gain an insight 
into emerging technologies and products and 
when these products were at a stage that the 
entrepreneurial venture threatened the parent 
company’s market positioning, or offered the 
opportunity to add significant revenue-
generating new products to its portfolio, the 
parent was in a strong position to take 
advantage of its knowledge. Note however that 
this is strictly an anecdotal comment given 
sample size and that, as cited above, exit is not 
necessarily a common method. 
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What are the questions to ask when 
setting up a CVC unit? 
 list of ‘best practice’ observations is not felt possible at this time, largely because of the lack 
of a ‘one size fits all’ model (as discussed above in terms of even the most basic objectives). 
Nevertheless, a company considering pursuing a CVC strategy should bear the following 
questions, comments and considerations in mind: 
Figure 7: Key Considerations for Establishing CVC Operations 
Key Question Key considerations Explanation 
  
What is the 
intended primary 
objective of the 
CVC programme? 
Strategic vs 
financial 
If the response to this question is financial returns 
alone, a company may be better placed investing 
through ‘traditional VC’. If the response is ‘strategic ’ 
as outlined above, the company should most likely 
consider an ‘off-balance sheet’ investment model in 
priority over an external (limited partner/general 
partner (LP-GP)) model as the former appears to 
enable financial and operational flexibility, whereas 
the latter appears more aligned with financial 
returns. 
Define objectives 
carefully 
Appreciate that CVC is only one means to capture 
innovation and is likely not a “panacea” for the 
company’s management team, neither is it likely to 
create a consistent M&A pipeline. 
What is the best 
way to configure 
the CVC unit? 
 
Employees 
Should the CVC team be comprised of existing 
corporate staff, or external VC professionals? 
Existing staff will likely have better internal networks, 
but lack venture investment experience, and vice-
versa. VC employees may also be more used to an 
incentive scheme (e.g. carried interest) which does 
not easily align with corporate remuneration 
packages to incentivise long-term loyalty. 
Delegated authority 
Depending on investment stages and CVC budget, 
the company may wish to give the investment team 
‘delegated authority’ up to a certain financial 
threshold. The investment team should be subject to 
appropriate ‘checks and balances’ to ensure any 
investments made under delegated authority meet 
CVC objectives. 
Employee 
incentives 
Incentives must align employees’ interests with long-
term fund objectives and reward performance. Whilst 
‘carry’ may not be favoured, if the company wishes 
to attract/retain capable investment professionals, it 
may be required. Equivalent schemes may be more 
appropriate, with claw-backs to motivate ‘the right’ 
type of investment and provide the company with 
checks and balances. 
A 
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How should 
investments be 
appraised? 
 
Investment 
Committee 
The investment committee composition should be 
formalised and aligned with the fund’s strategic 
objectives. Relevant, senior company board 
members should have oversight. Continued senior 
‘sponsorship’ of CVC is a necessity to maintain a 
focus on innovation, and to ensure the board is 
aware of how entrepreneurial ventures are driving 
disruption in the company’s markets of interest. 
Investment 
Appraisal 
Consider how closely aligned a potential 
investment’s ‘internal fit’ should be – must it align 
with existing BUs, or does this exclude opportunities 
which may be disruptive? A requirement to outline 
potential strategic benefits with BUs and to require a 
BU sponsor is likely to limit investment scope. 
Strategic and 
financial hurdles 
Consider the appropriateness of strategic hurdles 
and quantify them where possible. Appreciate that 
CVC involves ‘risk’ and it may not always be 
possible to mitigate, however that alone doesn’t 
mean a potential investment is a bad one – it may 
mean it’s just a highly disruptive technology or 
business model. 
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Appendix
Figure 8: Case Studies: Date of Establishment, Team Size & Geography  
 Established Team Size Team’s Primary Geographic Focys 
   
CVC 1 2007 9 US, Europe (and ‘Rest of World’) 
CVC 2 2000 20 US, Europe, Israel, India, Korea, Brazil, China  
CVC 3 1985 10 US & Europe 
CVC 4 2009 8 Europe, US, Israel, South America 
CVC 5 2001 13 Europe, Asia & US 
CVC 6 2006 3 Europe & US 
CVC 7 2011 3 Europe & US 
CVC 8 2014 1 Europe & US 
CVC 9 2000 4 US & Europe 
   
 
Figure 9: Case Studies: Investment Parameters Summary 
 
Investment 
Model 
Typical Investment 
Stage Focus 
Typical Investment 
Size 
Typical 
Equity Stake 
 
    
CVC 1 Off balance-sheet Mainly Stage B to E £2-10m <20% 
CVC 2 Off balance-sheet Early Stage, Series A 
and beyond US $1-10m <20% 
CVC 3 Off balance-sheet Early Stage, Series A 
and beyond 
US $100k (proof of 
concept), then $5-10m <20% 
CVC 4 Off balance-sheet Series A and B €1-5m <20% 
CVC 5 Internal dedicated 
fund (Single LP-
GP Relationship) 
Series A onwards €1-5m <20% 
CVC 6 External Fund Series A and beyond £1-2m <20% 
CVC 7 Off balance-sheet Series B and beyond £2-5m <20% 
CVC 8 Off balance-sheet Agnostic No set criteria No set criteria 
CVC 9 Internal dedicated 
fund Series A and B $5-7m <20% 
 
    
 
 
Series refer to stages in the VC funding process 
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